Normandy ’44 by James Holland

Normandy '44

Normandy ’44: D-Day and the Epic 77-Day Battle for France

A-
805 pages

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Wittmann rumbled forward and attacked at almost point-blank range and with complete surprise. Location 5175-5175 – location 5175-5175

As Dempsey and the British commanders were well aware, the moment the Germans counter-attacked, as they always did, they could then hammer them with their superior fire-power. That was exactly what happened. On the 30th, Dempsey and O’Connor took the decision to pull back from Hill 112 and so lose the vital high ground that had been so hard fought for, although a narrow bridgehead across the Odon was maintained. This has been repeatedly cited as a poor decision by weak-minded British commanders lacking the cut and thrust of their German opposite numbers. Neither O’Connor nor Pip Roberts, the 11th Armoured Division commander, could be described as lacking drive, however. It is possible they could have held on to Hill 112, but by the 30th there were no fewer than five Panzer divisions surrounding the bridgehead and the danger of it being pinched out and severed was considerable. Had that been the case, the leading elements isolated there would have been surrounded and annihilated, and historians would undoubtedly have been even more unforgiving. On balance, the risks probably did outweigh the benefits of potentially being able to hold on. By the end of 1 July, the EPSOM battle had effectively run its course for both sides. Kurt Meyer headed up to the top of Hill 112 that day and marvelled at the destruction he saw. Wrecked tanks from both sides littered the landscape, while of the trees that just a few days earlier had covered the hill there was now nothing left. Barely a square metre of earth lay untouched. The two-dimensional map gazed upon from afar and the violent reality on the ground were poles apart. Both here and where the Americans were. Location 6700-6712 – location 6700-6712

Much criticism has been poured on to the Allied efforts in Normandy, but this has often been made by armchair historians too quick to be dazzled by rapid-firing machine guns, big tanks, fiendish anti-tank guns and the supposed tactical acuity of the Germans. The British and Canadians have been blamed for being too stodgy, too ponderous and too scared to take risks. Even the Americans have come under the cosh for unimaginative tactics and for being too slow in the hedgerows. This criticism is, however, both misplaced and unfair. For all the Allies fire-power and incredible logistics arm, it was the infantry and the armour who had to take most of the ground and no one can justifiably criticize these men mostly conscripts from democratic countries rather than from totalitarian militaristic states for being slow. The risks were simply enormous, the sacrifice immense. The Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, for example, lost 44 officers even though the full establishment was only 36. A further 175 men of other ranks were lost from 200 in tanks in the regiment during the Normandy campaign. The 116th Infantry lost 100 per cent of its fighting strength. The incredible conveyor belt of replacements kept them going, but these units in the front line in Normandy suffered appallingly. Of course mistakes were made, and different decisions might have made a difference, but, on the whole, these citizen armies performed incredibly well. Location 9879-9889 – location 9879-9889

At almost every level, the Germans were failed by their high command. They simply never had enough of anything and were forced to dance to the Allies tune, not the other way around. The grinding down of their celebrated Panzer divisions, drawing them into battle in detail and before they were ready, ensured they could never manoeuvre and operate in the way they were designed to do. For far too long, the picture has been painted of the British, especially, banging their heads against a brick wall of Panzer divisions, when in fact it was the other way round. Location 9903-9906 – location 9903-9906

The Allied way of war was to use infantry and armour to goad the Germans into counter-attacking and then hammer them with their immense weight of fire-power. A British 155mm gun blasts enemy targets. A US Sherman of the 3rd Armored Division with an up-gunned 76mm high-velocity gun and a hedge-cutter. In terms of the gun, this was on a par with the Panther and Tiger. The same was true of the British Sherman Firefly, equipped with a 17-pounder anti-tank gun, which had a greater velocity than the fabled German 88mm. Location 10138-10144 – location 10138-10144

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